| Center for Mechanism Design and Economics of Information in IAR, SUFE is dedicated to study the role of information in the market and solve information asymmetry problem to allocate resources more efficiently through mechanism design, and also focus on building a more trustworthy and efficient networked market.
Information is a very important factor in economics. George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz were awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics for their studies on information asymmetry problems in different markets. For instance, Akerlof's seminar paper takes into account information asymmetry in used car markets, where information asymmetry would result in market failure (Akerlof, 1970). The study on the impact of information asymmetry in various markets is still of lots of interest in both academia and industry. Mechanism design is another important branch in economics and is mainly dedicated in private information games in game theory. The 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson, all of whom made pioneering contribution in this field. In recent years, the rapid development of Internet makes transactions possible between buyers and sellers who are far apart from each other and buyers are not able to see the actual goods. Online shopping has become part of many people's daily lives. According to “2009-2010 Monitoring Report on China E-Commerce Market" issued by Research Center of China E-Commerce, by the end of December 2009, the number of domestic online shoppers had reached 120 million, an increase of 90.7% compared with 2008. Despite the rapid development in e-commerce and online shopping, fraudulence and shoddy still exist. In China, according to the statistics provided by "March 15th" online consumption complaint website, the website received 21657 complaints about online shopping in 2009, an increase of 248.58% compared with last year. Since thorough understanding and cooperation are required in information and mechanism design in Internet market, the Center strives to serve as an interdisciplinary and high-level academic communication platform. The Center's research activities focus on the following aspects: 1. To study the solution of information asymmetry, i.e., the impact of information asymmetry and delay on financial markets, trust and trustworthiness in online markets and the design of efficient insurance, education and auction mechanisms, etc. 2. To verify theoretical models using experimental and empirical methods, collaborate with industries and their researchers on real world issues and publish research papers in top academic journals. 3. To hold regular seminars, international or domestic forums by inviting domestic and international specialists and scholars, government officials and experts in NGOs, etc. Contact Director Dr. Lingfang (Ivy) Li, Associate Professor of Economics Director, Center for Mechanism Design and Economics of Information (CMDEI) Institute for Advanced Research Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Add: 509, Building of SOE, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai, 200434 Tel: +86-21-65903944 E-mail: Lingfangivy.Li@gmail.com Core Expert Group Members Ning Sun Professor of Economics Benjamin Hak-Fung Chiao Associate Professor of Economics Hongjun Zhong Assistant Professor of Economics |
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